Spurred by the growth of transportation network companies and increasing data capabilities, vehicle routing and ride-matching algorithms can improve the efficiency of private transportation services. However, existing routing solutions do not address where drivers should travel after dropping off a passenger and before receiving the next passenger ride request, i.e., during the between-ride period. We address this problem by developing an efficient algorithm to find the optimal policy for drivers between rides in order to maximize driver profits. We model the road network as a graph, and we show that the between-ride routing problem is equivalent to a stochastic shortest path problem, an infinite dynamic program with no discounting. We prove under reasonable assumptions that an optimal routing policy exists that avoids cycles; policies of this type can be efficiently found. We present an iterative approach to find an optimal routing policy. Our approach can account for various factors, including the frequency of passenger ride requests at different locations, traffic conditions, and surge pricing. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the approach by implementing it on road network data from Boston and New York City.
I. INTRODUCTION
Advances in information technology and decision theory are helping revolutionize the market for private transportation services. Transportation Network Companies (TNCs) like Lyft and Uber utilized internet-enabled ride requests to quickly grow their market share in private transportation. From 2014 to 2016, Uber's market share for ride-hailing services rose from 18% to 75% in the United States [1] . Policy efforts increasingly support the concept of mobility as a service [2] . However, TNCs are also associated with concerns including increased congestion, low driver wages, and greenhouse gas emissions.
Tools from decision theory can utilize new sources of consumer and driver data to improve private transportation services. TNCs typically feature automated passenger ride matching and prices that vary geographically and temporally. Higher prices during peak demand periods are commonly referred to as surge prices. There is new opportunity for research to optimize surge pricing, improve system efficiency, and increase driver wages.
In this paper, we consider the situation where a driver seeks to maximize the expected value of their profits by optimizing routing decisions during the between-ride period. The between-ride period refers to the period after a driver drops off their passengers and before they receive their next ride request. 1 We formulate this problem as an undiscounted dynamic program with an uncertain number of decision stages; our formulation is equivalent to a stochastic shortest path problem. We prove that the between-ride problem has special characteristics; given reasonable assumptions, it can be efficiently solved as a dynamic program with a finite number of stages. We implement our algorithm using road network data from Boston and New York City, demonstrating that our approach is practical and scalable. Our algorithm can directly advise drivers between rides in order to maximize their profits. It could also help reduce system costs.
Current research on ride-sharing and TNCs focuses on the issue of driver-passenger matching. Based on location and congestion, matching algorithms link drivers to new passenger ride requests. Existing literature examines a wide variety of scenarios, including but not limited to: matching algorithms for ride-sharing and carpooling services [3] [4] [5] , high-capacity ride-sharing [6] , generalizations of ride-matching to cases where passengers might be asked to transfer vehicles during their journey [7] , and ride-matching in integrated systems of TNCs and public transport [8] . The authors in [9] overview related optimization literature.
Some matching algorithms will occasionally match a driver to their next ride while they are still driving the previous passenger. However, this is limited by consumer demand for rapid pickups and temporal variability of riderequests. Therefore, drivers frequently face their own routing decisions in the between-ride period, before a matching algorithm has successfully matched them with their next ride. Our algorithm provides routing advice during this period.
Our approach complements the aforementioned work on ride-matching: during the between-ride period, our algorithm can be used by drivers to navigate towards areas with high probability of new passenger requests by providing routing directions that align with their individual profit motive. These actions can improve the effectiveness of matching algorithms by helping drivers move to locations where matching algorithms are more likely to find them a high-value match.
The issue of location-based and distance-based pricing policy is also an active area of research. In [10] , the authors demonstrate how spatial pricing policy can be implemented to achieve better matching between supply of drivers and demand of passengers. The authors in [11] investigate the differences between dynamic and static pricing strategies. Each of these papers focus on pricing strategies, and drivers are assumed to move optimally towards areas with higher demand and prices. In practice, drivers are unlikely to make optimal between-ride decisions without the assistance of routing technology. Our research can support driver decision making and improve the validity of this assumption in transportation network pricing theory.
Section II describes the model and formulates the betweenride routing problem as a stochastic shortest path problem, a type of dynamic program. Section III proves that we can solve the between-ride routing problem by solving a finitehorizon dynamic program. Section IV presents a practical algorithm for finding an optimal solution to the between-ride routing problem, and Section V describes our implementation on data from Boston and New York City.
II. TECHNICAL MODEL
This section details the model for optimizing a betweenride route in order to maximize the expected value of profits for a driver. First, we detail the relevant parameters. Second, we explain the probability model whereby a driver receives ride requests at a particular location according to an exponential distribution. We specify the expected value of a route along points x ∈ R 2 on a 2-dimensional map. In the following Subsection II-A, we present a model of the road network as a directed, connected graph. We take the parameters of interest to be constant along each edge. We explain the driver objective function and optimization problem in terms of discrete decisions on the graph.
Consider a specific driver that does not currently have a passenger. Let w be the driver's wage rate, i.e. the value of their time. Let f be fuel and vehicle costs per unit distance.
For each location x on the map, let R x be the expected value of the profit from a ride request the driver receives at location x. We assume that the random profit from the ride accounts for its various features, including length, price, and duration, and the associated revenue and costs for the driver. For tractability, we assume that rides are undifferentiated aside from the expected value of their profit. 1 Furthermore, let Q x be the the pickup rate at location x, i.e. the expected value of the number of ride requests per minute. The values R x and Q x are indexed by x because they can vary at different points in the transportation network. These variables can change over time, but the algorithm assumes that they are static over the course of the betweenride decision making. This is a reasonable assumption given the short duration of between-ride routing; research from Denver suggests that the average between-ride period is less than 12 minutes, with a median of 7.5 minutes [12] . If inputs change or shocks occur, the algorithm can be rerun to optimize the remaining route during the between-ride period. This allows drivers to respond to real-time changes in demand and congestion. 2 1 In practice, ride opportunities can vary in other ways as well. For instance, rides at some locations are more likely to end at high-value locations, which would increase the expected value of profit from subsequent rides. In practice, this could be incorporated into these results by adjusting Rx to account for relevant characteristics, but a proper formulation would be non-myopic with regard to the value of subsequent rides. Future research could incorporate the value of subsequent rides. 2 Our model assumes that Rx and Qx are not influenced by the driver's route. It would also be interesting to consider the case where drivers actions directly influence the price and demand for rides, for instance in a gametheoretic or mean-field model. At any position x, we assume that ride requests arrive according to a Poisson process, and we model passenger ride requests via an exponential distribution. Consider a driver at position x(0) who travels along the route x(t) in continuous time. Let M be the random variable of the time the driver receives their first ride request along route x(t). Then,
In general, we assume the drivers must accept their first ride request, as is commonly required for drivers in TNCs. Let J be the expected value of the (net) profit through the next ride period for the between-ride driver on route x(t):
The value J accounts for the expected profits from earning a ride, minus the costs associated with time and travel during the between-ride period. In (2), the first term R x(t) Q x(t) corresponds to the expected profits earned at x(t), taking into account the likelihood of receiving a passenger match while at x(t). The second term w is the cost of the operator's time (their wage rate). The third term covers travel costs: f represents vehicle costs per mile (fuel plus maintenance), and dx dt represents the speed travelled along the route, accounting for local vehicle speeds and congestion. The trajectory x(t) is differentiable, so dx(t) dt exists and is finite for all t. From (1) and (2) we obtain the value of a driver waiting stationary at a particular location z, i.e. where ∀t x(t) = z:
This expression is intuitive: if a driver waits at location z until they receive a passenger match, they receive a ride match eventually with probability 1. Thus, their expected revenue is R z . The cost of waiting is their wage rate w times the expected value of the amount of time until they receive a passenger match Q −1 z . In general, a driver at location x(0) seeks to choose a trajectory x(t) to maximize (2). In the following section, we will model the road network as a graph and formulate the decision problem as a dynamic program in discrete time and space. As we will show, this leads to a tractable decision problem that can be efficiently solved.
A. Road Network Model
To solve the between-ride routing problem, we model the road network as a directed, connected graph G = (N, E). Each edge e ∈ E represents a section of a road, while the set of nodes N includes, but is not limited to, all road intersections. 3 Let |N | = n. Note that E includes all loops; i.e. ∀i ∈ N , (i, i) ∈ E. A driver on the edge (i, i) is said to be waiting at node i. The driver seeks to choose a policy to maximize their expected profit over an infinite horizon:
We can formulate the between-ride routing problem (4) as a stochastic shortest path problem 4 , which is an infinite horizon dynamic program and a type of Markovian Decision Problem (MDP). Let the state space X = N ∪ {m}, where we augment the set of nodes N with a terminal state m. When a driver moves to state m, we say that they are no longer in the between-ride routing period, because they have either found a rider or stopped offering rides. Once the driver reaches state m, they derive zero additional cost or value, so the decision problem equivalently terminates.
The policy µ = (µ 0 , µ 1 , µ 2 , ...) prescribes an action for each state in each stage k of the decision problem. The function g(x k , x k+1 , µ k (x k )) represents the value of transitioning to state x k+1 from state x k after choosing action µ k (x k ) at state x k in stage k (i.e. the transition value). It includes the potential value of receiving a ride match, less the costs associated with the driver's time and fuel costs. The transition probabilities are stationary; they are denoted by
At a specific state i ∈ N , the driver chooses the next location j with edge (i, j) ∈ E. For example, if a driver is located at a real-world intersection labelled i on our graph, and the driver elects to travel in the direction of an adjacent intersection j, they elect to travel along the roadway represented by edge (i, j) ∈ E. If j = i, then the time to traverse the edge from i to j is not a decision variable; it is given by the speed of traffic. If j = i, then we say that the driver is waiting at node i; the driver can choose how long to wait at node i before making a subsequent decision.
Formally, the driver chooses an action u ∈ U (i) where U (i) is the set of admissible actions at state i. The action u is a double, i.e. u = (u 1 , u 2 ), where u 1 specifies the navigation decision and u 2 specifies the waiting or travel 4 Stochastic shortest path problems were first formulated by [13] . Existing research [14] extends the analysis to the case where transition values may be positive or negative, which is helpful for our analysis. The two-volume textbook [15] [16] provides additional information on stochastic shortest path problems in each volume. time. Admissible actions (u 1 , u 2 ) ∈ U (i) have the following properties: the driving decision u 1 ∈ {j ∈ N |(i, j) ∈ E} ∪ {m} specifies the driver's next direction of travel, i.e. towards node j from node i. Note that for all i ∈ N , there is also an admissible action u with u 1 = m. This describes the case where the driver stops searching for another ride request and stops offering rides. 5 When u 1 = i, the driver is waiting at node i, and u 2 is chosen from the set u 2 ∈ (0, ∞]; in this case u 2 describes how long the driver will wait at node i before their next decision. Otherwise, u 2 = T (i,j) , the time required to travel from node i to j along (i, j) at the current speed of traffic, taking into account traffic and congestion.
Next, we apply (1)-(3) to the discrete graph, under the assumption that R x , Q x , and dx dt are constant along each edge, in order to explain (4) . Consider the transition probabilities and profits for a driver at node i ∈ N . Let the driver elect action u = (j, t) ∈ U (i) with e = (i, j) ∈ E. If j = i, then t is a decision variable; otherwise, t = T e . Along edge e, the constant Q e > 0 represents the arrival rate for ride requests. Then, from (1),
When a driver selects action u = (j, t), they receive a match and move to node m with probability p im (u). Otherwise, they fail to receive a match and travel to node j; hence, p ij (u) = 1 − p im (u). In the latter case, they face their next discrete decision at node j, after duration t. Remember that if j = i, then t = T e , because drivers must move at the speed of traffic along a particular edge. 6 A driver taking the admissible action u = (j, t) at node i receives transition value g(i, m, u) from a match, or g(i, j, u) from a transition to node j (no match). From (2),
As before, the values w and f refer to the driver's fixed wage rate and fuel/vehicle cost. The expected value of the ride revenue for every edge e ∈ E is known and stationary in the time period of interest, and given by R e > 0. The driver drives at a constant speed S e along each edge (which is directly the edge distance divided by T e ). The variable φ e (t) is the expected value of the time until a match occurs along edge e, when the edge is traversed over a time period t, conditional on the fact that a match does occur (6) , we can write the expected value of the transition profit at any state i according to the transition probabilities and duration associated with the admissible action u = (j, t), again with e = (i, j):
Note that S h = 0 for loops h, i.e. edges of the form h = (i, i). The idea is that the only cost for drivers when they are waiting is due to their time, not due to gas or other per-distance vehicle costs. When u 2 = ∞, we evaluate the associated transition probabilities and profits as the limits of the provided equations when t goes to infinity; these limits exist for each of the expressions in (5), (6) , and (7). Since m is the terminal node, ∀u, p mm (u) = 1 and g(m, u) = 0. The driver receives value when they transition to m randomly by receiving a ride request. Once a driver reaches m, they have accepted a ride request or stopped offering rides. They receive no additional value and the decision problem ends. As explained previously, at any node i ∈ N , the driver can select to stop offering rides; mechanistically, this is performed as an action to move directly to the terminal node without any reward. At any node i ∈ N , for action u with u 1 = m, p im (u) = 1 and g(i, u) = 0. The idea is that the driver can elect to stop offering rides at any time, which incurs no further cost but eliminates the opportunity to collect revenue from a ride.
Going forward, we assume that local maxima of R e − w Qe are defined as nodes. The intuition is that any physical roadway location where a driver would optimally wait is defined in our graph as a node. Consider edge e = (j, k) with j = k. Then
From any input data, it is straightforward to ensure that a map meets the required assumption by adding a node along or in the middle of any edge that violates (8) .
The policy µ defines actions µ k (i) for each state i ∈ X in each decision period k. In practice, the policy µ can vary in each decision stage. However, we focus on stationary policies where µ = (µ, µ, ...) at each stage. As we will show, at least one of these stationary policies is optimal, justifying our narrow focus. Due to the focus on stationary policies, in the subsequent Section we drop the stage k subscript from our notation. Instead, µ refers to stationary policies, and µ(i) refers to the action associated with policy µ at node i ∈ N . Therefore, with some abuse of notation, we let µ 1 (i) and µ 2 (i) refer to the actions (direction and waiting time) associated with policy µ at node i ∈ N .
III. RESULTS
Optimal policies for infinite horizon dynamic programs like (4) are typically solved using convergence of value iteration (VI) algorithms [15] . In general, this can lead to suboptimal results despite extensive computation periods; this could limit the value of this procedure for the between-ride routing problem, since driving suggestions should ideally be provided to multiple drivers in a network and available very quickly after a driver drops off their previous passenger and enters the between-ride period. However, in this section, we show that the between-ride routing problem has special structure that allows us to efficiently find a solution, using a finite-horizon dynamic program with n stages.
Since edge has a non-zero probability of a match, 7 then for any policy, there is always a positive probability that the termination state will be reached.
Let J * (i) be the optimal value of (4), with initial location x 0 = i. Then, as explained by [15] , optimal values J * (1), ..., J * (n) at nodes i ∈ N indexed by 1, ..., n satisfy Bellman's Equation:
We will show that there exists an optimal stationary policy that obtains the maximum of (9) for all states i. Under this proposed policy, there are no temporary stops: whenever the driver chooses to wait at a particular node without moving, they wait at that node until they receive a ride request. 8 Then, we will demonstrate that this optimal stationary policy has no cycles, i.e. P(x k = i, x k = i) = 0 for any states i ∈ N and stages k, k ∈ N with k = k . Together, this implies that an optimal policy can be found using a type of value iteration algorithm requiring at most n + 1 steps. Proposition 1. There exists a stationary policy µ * that is optimal for the decision problem (4) . Under this stationary policy, whenever a driver waits at a specific node, they plan to remain at that node until they receive a ride request, i.e. ∀i ∈ N , µ * 1 (i) = i implies µ * 2 (i) = ∞. Proof. First, letŨ (i) define a restricted action space for node i. We say that u = (u 1 , u 2 ) ∈Ũ (i) if u 1 ∈ {j ∈ N |(i, j) ∈ E} ∪ {m} and u 2 = ∞ if u 1 = i, or u 2 = T (i,j) if u 1 = i. Note that ∀i ∈ N ,Ũ (i) ⊂ U (i). This restricted action space implies that whenever a driver chooses to wait at a node, they will wait at that node until they receive a ride request.
The values of J * (1), ..., J * (n) given by (9) are unchanged if we replace the constraint sets U (i) withŨ (i). To see this, fix J * (1), ..., J * (n) according to (9) , and fix a set of actions µ * (i) that attain the optimal values of (9) for each state i; by definition, µ * defines an optimal stationary policy. Define the set I = {i|µ * 1 (i) = i}. Define an additional policy µ such that ∀i / ∈ I, µ(i) = µ * (i), and ∀i ∈ I, µ 1 
For an arbitrary policyμ, let there be some i ∈ N with µ 1 (i) = i andμ 2 (i) = t i . Let = (i, i). Then ∀i with µ 1 (i) = i, Fig. 2 . First few steps of our algorithm on a simple road network. Red arrows indicate optimal paths found so far. Initially, the algorithm sets all drivers to stay where they are. By the end of the fourth step, the algorithm dictates that drivers at V 1 and V 2 should go to V 4 and V 3 respectively, while drivers at V 4 and V 3 stay where they are. due to equations (5) and (7) and by definition of the terminal state with J(m) = 0. This implies that ∀i ∈ I
The first equality is found by evaluating (10) forμ(i) = µ * (i) and algebraically solving for J µ * (i). The second equality is found by evaluating (10) for µ(i) by taking the limit of the right hand side as t i → ∞.
Subsequently, this implies that ∀i / ∈ I, J µ * (i) = J µ (i), since for each i / ∈ I, the objective function in (9) is unchanged. Therefore, we can restrict the decision space tõ U i , and the same J * (1), ..., J * (n) as above satisfy
Therefore, any policy µ that obtains the maximum in (12) also obtains the maximum in (9) .
For each state i, the optimization problem in (12) describes a finite and discrete choice set with |Ũ (i)| ≤ n+1. Therefore, there exists some µ such that for all i ∈ N , µ(i) obtains the maximum in (12) . This µ describes a stationary policy, because the objective function and constraints in (12) do not change across decision periods. We showed that µ also obtains the maximum of (9) . As shown by [15] , this implies that µ is optimal for the decision problem (4).
Proposition 2.
There exists an optimal stationary policy µ that meets the characteristics of Proposition 1 and has no cycles with probability 1, i.e. P(x k = i, x k = i) = 0 for any state i ∈ N and decision stages k, k ∈ N, k = k .
Proof. Let µ refer to an optimal stationary policy that meets the criteria of Proposition 1. By examining (5) , we see that P(x k = i, x k = i) > 0 under policy µ only if the policy admits a cycle (possibly of length 1): ∃{ 1 , 2 , ..., p } ⊂ N such that under µ, we have that µ 1 ( 1 ) = 2 , µ 1 ( 2 ) = 3 , ..., µ 1 ( p ) = 1 . For each i ∈ 1, ..., p, let e i = ( i , µ 1 ( i )) ∈ E.
Assume the policy admits a cycle. Without loss of generality, let 1 be the maximum valued waiting node in the loop:
and let V ( 1 ) be the optimal value of the objective function in (13) . Then, by (8) and because f, S e > 0, for all i ∈ 1, ..., p we have that g( i , µ) ≤ p im (µ)V ( 1 ). Then, we can write Bellman's equation for the policy µ as
Letp be the probability of receiving a ride request anywhere along the cycle, i.e.p = 1 − p 1 2 (µ)p 2 3 (µ)...p p 1 (µ). Rewriting (10), Since for all i ∈ 1, ..., p g( i , µ) ≤ p im (µ)V ( 1 ), we can provide an upper bound forp J µ ( 1 ):
The final equality combines the terms on the right hand side usingp . Sincep > 0, (16) 
Let µ define a policy with µ (j) = µ(j) for all j ∈ N with j = 1 , and µ 1 ( 1 ) = 1 and µ 2 ( 1 ) = ∞. Then as shown in (11) , J µ ( 1 ) = V ( 1 ). Considering also the optimality of policy µ, J µ ( 1 ) = J µ ( 1 ). Due to this equality, and since µ (j) = µ(j) for all j = 1 , then ∀i ∈ N , J µ (i) = J µ (i). Therefore, µ is an optimal stationary policy. If µ still contains a cycle (i.e., if µ contained multiple such cycles), this procedure can be repeated until the resulting policy has no such cycles; this would require at most n repetitions.
Let µ * be the first policy constructed using (potentially multiple) iterations of the above procedure, starting from the original optimal stationary policy µ, such that µ * has no cycles. Then under µ * there does not exist any { 1 , 2 , ..., p } ⊂ N with |{ 1 , 2 , ..., p }| > 1, such that µ *
Furthermore, in µ * , for all i with µ * (i) = i, then µ * 2 (i) = ∞ by construction. Thus, for any subset of nodes { 1 , 2 , ..., p } ⊂ N , containing an arbitrary number of nodes, p 1 2 (µ * )p 2 3 (µ * )...p p 1 (µ * ) = 0. Therefore, under policy µ * , for any i ∈ N , k, k ∈ N, P(x k = i, x k = i) = 0. Equivalently, there exists an optimal policy µ * that has no cycles with probability 1.
The policy µ * represents an optimal stationary policy with no cycles. Therefore, under some optimal policy, every decision node is visited at most once. This implies that there are at most n decision stages. Furthermore, there is an optimal stationary policy over n decision stages. Therefore, from any starting node x 0 , (4) is exactly solved by
This can be solved exactly by n iterations of a Value Iteration (VI) algorithm, which we present in the following section.
IV. PATH-FINDING ALGORITHM This section describes the Value Iteration (VI) algorithm that solves the between-ride problem, obtaining the optimal values in equation (17) and, therefore, equation (4) . First, we pre-process the network graph to ensure it satisfies the condition (8) . This section describes the algorithm and proves that our algorithm is optimal for the appropriately preprocessed map. The main algorithmic steps follow:
1) Initially, we calculate the expected driver revenueJ(x) for waiting at every location x, from (3). 2) We "relax" each edge iteratively to see if traveling through it will provide a more optimal path for drivers on the connecting vertices. We do this by iteratively applying (12) on every edge. 3) We terminate the algorithm when no better path is found after iterating through all edges. The algorithm returns a provably optimal solution. This result is proven in the next Subsection. As an added benefit, the algorithm simultaneously solves for the optimal path for all drivers in the road network. The total runtime remains the same even if more drivers are added to the network. Figure 2 illustrates the first few steps of running the algorithm on a simple road network. Below, we present the pseudocode for the algorithm. We use x.stay to denoteJ(x) from (3), and e to denote the edge (x, y). x.value ← x.stay Initialize values toJ(x) from (3) 3:
x.next ← −1 -1 means stay at the current node 4: for k := 1 to n do 5: for (x, y) ∈ E do 6: RELAX(x, y) 7:
8: function RELAX(x, y) 9: value ← (Re − w+f Se Qe )(1 − e −QeTe ) + e −QeTe y.value 10: if value > x.value then 11: x.next ← y 12:
x.value ← value At completion, Algorithm 1 outputs include the optimal action x.next and the optimal expected value of net profit x.value for any node x.
A. Proof of Correctness
From Section III, we have that from any starting node, there is an optimal policy that results in a path that traverses at most n edges in E with probability 1. Therefore, we can focus on policies that are optimal for n decision stages. These policies transverse a path of length less than or equal to n. This motivates the following definition:
denote the optimal value attainable if you start from x with k + 1 decision stages, i.e. you start at x and travel through a path of length at most k + 1.
Recall that J * (x) is the optimal value attainable, starting from x, considering all potential policies and paths of potentially infinite length. By definition of the optimal policy, ∀x ∈ N , ∀k ∈ N, V k (x) ≤ J * (x). Proposition 2 concludes that ∀x ∈ N , V n (x) = J * (x). Note also that V 0 (x) =J(x), based on our initialization. This leads to the following Proposition: Proposition 3. After k iterations of the for loop in line 4 of algorithm 1 (i.e. after we relax all the edges, repeatedly, k times), for each node x the stored value V (x) of the node satisfies the following: 1. It is the value obtained from a valid policy. 2. It is larger than or equal to V k (x).
Proof. To prove the first property, we use induction and consider what happens when a single edge is relaxed. For the base case, at the start V (x) =J(x), and hence V (x) is the value for a valid policy (waiting at the node x until a ride request is received). In the inductive case, suppose we relax edge (x, y), changing the value of node x from V i (x) to V (x), with V (x) as defined in line 9 of Algorithm 1. From the previous step, V (y) is a value associated with a valid policy. It thus follows that V (x) is the value of valid policy since (x, y) ∈ E.
To prove the second property, we induct on the value of k. In our base case k = 0, we initialized each node with V (x) =J(x) = V 0 (x), so the second property holds immediately. Then for our inductive case, suppose value V k (x) is achieved by a valid policy µ. After we relax all of the edges, we aim to show through the inductive step that V (x) ≥ V k+1 (x). Without loss of generality, assume the action associated with node x under the optimal policy with k + 1 decision stages is µ 1,1 (x) = y, i.e. the chosen direction from node x in stage 1 is towards node y. Then, by the principal of optimality, V k (y) must be the value achieved by the same policy µ starting at y; otherwise we will be able to achieve a better value of V k+1 (x) by selecting µ 1,1 (x) = y and then following the policy that corresponds to V k (y), which violates the optimality of V k+1 (x).
From this we know that V k+1 (x) = (R e − w+f Se Qe )(1 − e −QeTe ) + e −QeTe V k (y) with e = (x, y). By our assumption in the inductive step, the value for node y after k iterations Fig. 3 . Implementation of the algorithm in Boston, MA. The left image represents the expected value of net profits for drivers who wait at any location until they receive their next passenger request, i.e.J(x). Red and yellow boxes representing higher and lower values ofJ(x) respectively. The right image represents the routes returned by optimal policies for drivers at starting nodes represented by the black dot. The color along the route represents the probability that the driver still does not have a passenger request when driving along the route at that location, with red and yellow representing higher and lower probabilities, respectively. The probability values are also marked at various points along the routes. For example, the number 0.37 is marked along one route; this implies that the driver has a 63% chance of receiving a ride request before arriving at that location along the route. The end of each colored line indicates a location where the driver will optimally wait until receiving a ride request. of the for loop must satisfy V (y) ≥ V k (y), because our algorithm only increases the stored value V (y).
Then in the k-th iteration, when we update edge (x, y), we have the inequality:
which completes the proof. Fig. 4 . Details for two implementations of our algorithm. The data-process time includes the time required to parse the OpenStreetMaps xml data of the road network and store it as a graph structure. The algorithm time includes the time required to calculate the optimal policy for all drivers given the road network graph and applicable parameters.
After n iterations of relaxing all edges, the values stored in each node V (x) = V n (x). As demonstrated in Proposition 2, V n (x) = J * (x).
Finally, observe that the x.next values for each node provide the optimal stationary policy µ 1 (x) for each node x ∈ N . By tracing the sequence of decisions {x 0 , x 1 = x 0 .next, x 2 = x 1 .next...} we can find a path that follows an optimal policy, starting from an initial node x 0 ∈ N .
The algorithm gives a worst-case runtime of O(n|E|), since relaxing each edge takes constant time, and we perform O(n|E|) total relaxations in lines 4 and 5 of Algorithm 1. We can assume a constant upper bound C on the number of edges connected to any particular vertex in a transportation map, because the number of roads converging at any particular intersection has some upper bound that does not depend on the number of nodes, i.e. |E| ≤ Cn. Therefore the worst-case runtime is O(n 2 ). 9
V. IMPLEMENTATION
To demonstrate the feasibility and scalability of our algorithm, we implemented it using road network data from Boston, MA, and New York, NY. We used open source data from Open Street Maps [17] to obtain the road network data. We used posted speed limits as initial values for S e and T e . We divide the map into a grid and set experimental values for R e and Q e in each gridbox. Future research could utilize TNC data to analyze the results and profit improvements for this algorithm with realistic values of R e and Q e . Figure 3 demonstrates an example output for the city of Boston. We recorded the time taken to run the algorithm, using a standard laptop with a Intel Core i7-5500U CPU @ 2.40GHz×4 processor and 8GB RAM. Overall, the program took less than 3 seconds to implement the optimization algorithm, demonstrating the feasibility of our approach. The relevant information is shown in Figure 4 . Fig. 5 . Comparison of the expected value of net profits from Algorithm 1 and from the shortest path heuristic described in Section V. The expected value of net profit is averaged across all nodes, for implementations in both Boston and New York. Peak and off-peak values are calculated by adjusting roadway travel speeds to match the expected levels of congestion during peak and off-peak travel periods. Average speed data in peak and off-peak periods is given by [18] .
We can compare the optimal value obtained by our approach to the expected value of net profits obtained by other routing decisions. For example, we can compare the optimal value to the value associated with a route where the driver takes the shortest path towards the node with the highest expected valueJ(x) (we call this route the "shortest path heuristic"). The shortest path heuristic represents a natural heuristic policy for drivers in the between-ride period: head towards the highest value location. Figure 5 compares the expected value of net profit for our algorithm versus the shortest path heuristic.
Algorithm 1 provides significant improvements over the shortest path heuristic. For example, during peak congestion periods in Boston, the value achieved by Algorithm 1's optimal route is $5.45, a 17% average improvement over the value obtained by the shortest path heuristic. At certain nodes, the optimal route increases the expected value of profit by 25-50%. These calculations represent a back-ofthe-envelope effort to test the value of our algorithm. Future research could use real-world price and traffic data in order to more accurately measure the benefits of our between-ride algorithm and to test the conditions that influence its value.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper models the between-ride routing problem for private transportation providers and TNC drivers. We seek to optimize routing to maximize the expected value of net profits for a driver that does not currently have a passenger and who is awaiting their next ride request. Our algorithm can account for various factors, including the pickup rate at different locations, surge pricing, fuel costs, and traffic.
We model the decision problem as an dynamic program with an uncertain number of stages before termination; this is equivalent to the stochastic shortest path problem. We show that under reasonable conditions, the between-ride problem can be solved to optimality by solving a simpler finitehorizon dynamic program. We present an algorithm using an iterative technique related to Value Iteration, and illustrate the feasibility of this algorithm by implementing it on road networks from Boston and New York City.
There are several interesting areas for future research related to the between-ride routing problem. Our algorithm fo-cuses on a single between-ride period. Future research could focus on the driver's optimization problem over multiple rides, considering variability in the probability distribution of ride destinations from different origins. Future research could also incorporate additional driver factors, like fatigue, driving preferences, and desired end locations.
Future work could also model the between-ride routing of drivers as a strategic game, where operators anticipate and respond to the behavior and trajectory of other drivers. Our algorithm focuses on the case where the behavior of individual drivers does not substantively change the rate of passenger ride requests or the value of rides in different locations. When there are multiple drivers in the network, driver behavior could impact prices and pickup rates at different locations. Extensions could use tools from game theory or mean field theory to develop optimal strategies that anticipate the decisions of other drivers.
